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An Aspect of Variable Population Poverty Comparisons:
Does Adding a Rich Person to a Population Reduce Poverty?i
I.

Introduction

Poverty indexes are essential for monitoring poverty, setting targets for poverty
reduction, and tracking progress on these goals. No single paper could review, never mind
evaluate, every proposed poverty measure in the literature. This paper suggests, however, that
further justification is necessary for using the main poverty indexes in the literature in any of
these ways (including those the World Bank makes easily available for empirical research). ii It
does so by arguing that poverty should not decline with the mere addition of a rich person to a
population. It, then, demonstrates that the standard poverty indexes do not satisfy this Weak
Population Focus Axiom. Weak Population Focus is similar to, but less demanding than, what
some have called the Poverty Focus and Nonpoverty-Invariance axioms (Subramanian, 2002;
Paxton, 2003).iii So, it is significant that, unless the main poverty indexes in the literature are
modified, they do not satisfy Weak Population Focus. In suggesting a modification of the
standard indexes, this paper also isolates the reason why they fail to satisfy this axiom.iv
Unlike most work on poverty indexes that focuses on income as a proxy for poverty, this
paper will not presuppose an answer to the question: “What is the proper basis for poverty
measurement?” Poverty may, for instance, be deprivation in the space of welfare, capabilities,
resources, or opportunities. To stay neutral on the proper basis for poverty measurement, this
paper will refer to this basis as need. It will refer to whatever alleviates need or brings someone
up higher above the poverty line as a good. Material goods, capabilities, opportunities, and
welfare may be goods in this sense and they may alleviate need.
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Like most work on axiomatic poverty measurement, however, this paper will assume that
there are better and worse answers to questions like: “What is poverty?” “How much poverty is
there in a population?” and “Which population is poorer?” There may be room for multiple
answers to these questions. What counts as poverty may, for example, be different in some
contexts (e.g. in the US and Peru).v Still, some things do not count as appropriate answers to the
questions above. On any good account, for instance, most of the people living in the slums of
New Delhi must count as poor.vi
Moreover, for simplicity, this paper will assume that we know each individual’s poverty
level and that full interpersonal comparisons of need are possible. vii That is, it assumes that
questions like “How do individual identities and histories matter to their poverty?” and “Is
poverty absolute or relative?” have already been answered.viii
Keeping these preliminaries in mind, the first part of this paper will consider methods for
calculating poverty. It will argue that, when the main indexes in the literature are interpreted as
providing a measure of the poverty in a population, these indexes violate an axiom or intuition
that (Hassoun & Subramanian, 2010) have called:
(1) Weak Population Focus: Poverty in a population is not reduced by changes in the nonpoor population which leave the distribution of goods amongst the poor unchanged.ix
The next section will consider why the main indexes in the literature violate this axiom if they
are interpreted as measures of poverty in a population. It will then explain how it is easy to
modify these indexes to avoid this problem.
I.

Axiom for a Plausible Account of Poverty in Variable Populations

Before defending Weak Population Focus, it is important to distinguish between poverty
in a population and related concepts like a population’s poverty.x Considering two populations,
X and Y, saying there is more poverty in population X than in Y means:
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(1) X has more poverty than Y (that is: there is more poverty present in X than in Y)
This is not necessarily equivalent to the following statement about these populations’ poverty:
(2) X is poorer than Y (that is: X is less wealthy overall than Y)
If 'poorer' is the converse of 'richer' like, e.g., 'worse' is the inverse of 'better'), (2) is equivalent
to:
(3) Y is richer than X.
But (3) is not equivalent to (1). Suppose X and Y only contain rich people but each person in Y
is much richer than each person in X. Y is richer than X but it is not the case that X has more
poverty than Y. Neither contains any poverty at all.
Another way of seeing the distinction is to consider the following claims:
(4) Merely adding rich people to a population can make a population richer.
(5) Merely adding rich people to a population cannot reduce poverty.
(6) Making a population less poor is the same as making it richer.
(7) Making a population less poor is the same as reducing poverty.
Each of these claims is plausible on its own but, together, they are inconsistent:
Combining (4) and (6) we get:
(8) Merely adding rich people to a population can make a population less poor.
Combining (8) and (7) we get:
(9) Merely adding rich people to a population can reduce poverty.
This contradicts:
(5) Merely adding rich people to a population cannot reduce poverty.
The problem is that “less poor” is ambiguous – it may mean “more rich” or “contain(s)
less poverty.” The first definition is only clearly appropriate when we are considering a
population’s poverty.xi Judgments about a population’s poverty entail that if population A is
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poorer than B, B is richer than A. Saying there is more poverty in population A than B means A
has more poverty than B but does not necessarily entail B is richer than A. Rather, this paper will
argue that this claim is false.
It is also possible to distinguish between the poverty in a population and the average
poverty.xii The later will presumably divide the poverty in the population by the population size.
Though, there are many possible measures of both the poverty in a population and the average
poverty.
Keeping these distinctions in mind, it is possible to put this paper’s point this way: it may
be precisely because people have not distinguished carefully between the poverty in a population
and related concepts like a population’s poverty or the average poverty that most poverty
indexes entail that merely adding a rich person to a population reduces poverty. This may be
appropriate where we are concerned about a population’s poverty (and “poorer” is the inverse of
“richer”) or the average poverty. It is not clearly true that merely adding rich people to a
population will reduce the poverty in a population. Rather, this paper will argue that merely
adding rich people to a population will not reduce the poverty in a population.
More precisely, this paper suggests adopting Weak Population Focus on which the
poverty in a population cannot decline with additions to the rich population that leave the
number and needs of the poor unchanged (though a population’s poverty or the average poverty
may decline with additions to the rich population that leave the number and needs of the poor
unchanged). The rich may, of course, do a lot to alleviate poverty in a population. They might
voluntarily or involuntarily give money (or other things) to the poor or their money (etc.) might
trickle down to the poor. But, their mere existence in a population does not reduce poverty in a
population. To illustrate the import of this axiom consider the following population:
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P1 P2 P3
Here the (dotted) poverty line is at three units of good. The first person, P1, has one unit
of good, so needs two units to reach the poverty line. The second person, P2, has two units of
good, so needs one more unit to reach the poverty line. The last person, P3, has more than three
units of good, so is not poor. The Weak Population Focus Axiom suggests that simply adding
more people who can meet their needs to the population does not reduce its poverty. So, adding
an additional person P4 who can meet his or her needs to the population does not reduce the
poverty in the population.

P1 P2 P3 P4
Nor would poverty in this population decline if P4 were much richer or there were additional rich
people in it.
If some of the rich become poor, the poverty in a population might change. Even if some
poor become rich at the same time, one might say poverty in the population has increased. This
might be so if the newly poor are poorer than the newly rich were when they were poor or if
there are more poor people.
As Amartya Sen puts it, it is also important to distinguish between descriptive indexes
which are concerned with “‘the state of the poor’” and indexes intended to measure other things
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like a population’s “potential ability to meet the challenge of poverty” (Sen, 1981, 190). The
burden of poverty might, for instance, be less if rich people are just added to a population and
nothing else changes.xiii That is, it might be much easier to alleviate poverty by redistributing
some goods from the rich to the poor. There may also be some respects in which adding rich
people to a population makes it better (or worse) than the initial population. The new population
might be better able to support the arts or sciences. Still, the mere addition of P4 does not in
itself reduce poverty in this population.xiv
The intuition supporting Weak Population Focus is along the same lines as the intuition
Sen expresses in objecting to the idea “that some increase in the income shortfall of the poor may
be compensated by a sufficiently high rise in the income of the non-poor” (Sen, 1981, 190). He
says “poverty is a characteristic of the poor, and a reduction of the incomes of the poor must
increase the measure of poverty, no matter how much the incomes of the non-poor go up at the
same time” (Sen, 1981, 190). Similarly, if poverty is a characteristic of the poor, an increase in
the number of rich people should not alone reduce poverty in a population. A change in the
number of rich people does not affect the poor any more than if the incomes of the rich increase.
That is, adequate measures of poverty in a population will satisfy Weak Population Focus.
One might, however, object to Weak Population Focus by noting that, even though a
measure of the poverty in a population is not necessarily a measure of how it is best to fulfill
needs, these things are related. Perhaps the best explanation for intuitions about how it is best to
meet need is that poverty in a population decreases when the only change is that more people
who can meet their needs are added to the population. Consider an argument for this conclusion
inspired by David Miller’s work on how we should fulfill need. Miller is concerned with
distribution according to need and claims that it is important, in deciding whom to help, to
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consider not only P1’s claims vs. P2 and P3’s claims but P1’s claims against P4’s claims (e.g. to
what they need). He believes it is important to consider “the relative position of everyone” in
determining whom we should aid in a population (Miller, 1999, 219). Miller thinks it is better to
help those in the middle of the stack when there are a greater number of rich people around.
Perhaps this is because poverty in the population with more rich people is worse. This might
support the intuition that it is best to “equalize degrees of unmet need, which means distributing
in favor of those in greater need until they are brought up to the same level as others” (Miller,
1999, 74).
Miller suggests that his intuition about how to distribute according to need underlies
some empirical evidence from experiments in social psychology. In one experiment, there were
two students one of whom needed extra money for books. Subjects had to decide how to split a
set amount of money between them. Most subjects wanted to give the needy student enough to
buy the textbooks before splitting the rest equally (Miller, 1999, 74). In another experiment,
intended to mimic John Rawls’ original position, subjects had to choose the rules for
remuneration for work they were to perform. Most subjects chose to maximize average income
subject to a floor constraint.
The empirical evidence does not support Miller’s intuition about how to distribute
according to need so one cannot use this evidence to argue that there is less poverty in a
population when the only change is that more people who can meet their needs are added to the
population. The first experiment only provides evidence that sometimes people will try to help
others meet their needs before distributing the remaining goods equally. The second experiment
only provides evidence that most people want to provide a flat minimum for everyone (Frohlich
& Oppenheimer, 1992; Miller, 2001, 79). The results just show that people are concerned about
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need, not that “people will aim to equalize degrees of unmet need” (Miller, 2001, 74). xv The
evidence does not support Miller’s intuition about what distribution according to need requires
(Hassoun, 2008). Hence, one cannot argue that the best explanation for why people share
Miller’s intuition about how we should meet need is that poverty in a population decreases when
the only change is that more people who can meet their needs are added to the population. Unless
there is a better reason to reject Weak Population Focus, we should accept it.
II.

Problems with the Existing Poverty Indexes and a Solution

Many of the most common poverty indexes fail to satisfy the Weak Population Focus
Axiom because these indexes normalize for population size by dividing by the total number of
people in the population. These indexes are better interpreted as measures of the average
poverty. Consider the simplest example -- the Headcount Index (H) which measures the
proportion of people below the poverty line.
H = q/n
(1)

n is the number of people in the population and q the number of people who have an amount of
good yi less than the amount necessary to reach the poverty line z . The problem is that adding a
person above the poverty line to the population only increments n and, so, poverty declines.
Many other common poverty indexes fail to satisfy Weak Population Focus. The appendix
demonstrates that this is so for Sen’s Index and the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index. Consider, here,
just the Foster, Greer, Thorbecke (FGT) Index.
q

FGT  1 / n( xia )
i 1

(2)
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xi is the poverty gap of individual i that is ( z  y i ) / z . Since

q



xia aggregates the (weighted)

i 1

poverty gaps of the poor only, it is unchanged by the mere addition of a rich person to a
population. Because the addition of a rich person increases n, however, poverty declines on the
FGT when the only change is that a rich person is added to the population.
It, thus, seems that some justification is necessary for using the main poverty indexes in
the literature in tracking poverty, setting poverty reduction targets, and so forth. If one is
concerned to measure the poverty in a population, one should not use these indexes because they
suggest poverty decreases with the mere addition of a rich person to a population. These indexes
are better interpreted as providing measures of a population’s poverty or the average poverty.
If the above indexes are interpreted as measuring a population’s poverty or the average
poverty, it is easy to see how to modify them to arrive at a measure of the poverty in a
population: Do not divide by the total number of people in the population. So, for instance, H

q

would just become q and the FGT would become the Aggregate Gap Index:



xia . Modifying

i 1

the standard poverty indexes in this way will ensure that they satisfy Weak Population Focus.
Moreover, there seems to be some reason to accept a version of the Aggregate Gap Index
as a measure of the poverty in a population. As least this is so if researchers can arrive at the
correct account of individuals’ poverty. The Aggregate Gap Index (with a=1) just adds up each
individual’s poverty. So it is plausible to hold that the Aggregate Gap Index yields the (total)
poverty in a population.xvi
III.

Conclusion
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This paper has argued that the main poverty indexes in the literature may not be
appropriate for tracking poverty, setting poverty reduction goals, and monitoring progress in
meeting those targets. If the main poverty indexes in the literature are interpreted as measures of
poverty in a population and are not modified, they unintuitively suggest that poverty in a
population declines with the mere addition of rich people. So some justification for using these
indexes is necessary, especially since it is easy to modify them so that they satisfy Weak
Population Focus. Moreover, assuming that researchers can arrive at the proper basis for poverty
measurement, there is some reason to accept the Aggregate Gap Index as a measure of poverty in
a population; there is reason to believe it tells us the sum-total amount of poverty in the
population. In any case, further work on variable population poverty comparisons is pressing and
important.
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Appendix
Consider the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index (SST) index and Sen’s index (S) Here is the
SST:
q

SST

P (a;z) =



((2(n  i))  1) / n 2 )(( z  xi ) / z )

(3)

i 1

Here is S:
PS(a;z) =
PS(a;z) = 2 /((q  1)nz )

q



(q  1  i )( z  xi )

(4)

i 1

where a is a vector of goods, n is the number of people in the population, q is the number of poor
individuals in the population, i is the order of the individuals in the distribution of goods – where
n has the most, and x i is the amount of good individual i has.
It is easy to demonstrate that the SST and S do not satisfy Weak Population Focus.xvii It
will suffice to present a counter-example. Consider the following vectors of goods x and y such
that y is derived from x by the addition of a non-poor person. Without loss of generality,
supposing an exclusive definition of poverty (that is that those with 0 good do not count as poor),
and in line with the statement above, let x = (0, z) and y = (0, z, z), where z denotes the poverty
line.
Proposition 1. The Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index (SST) does not satisfy Weak Population Focus.
Proof.
We have:
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PSST((0, z);z) = (2*1 + 1)/22 * (z/z) + (2*0 + 1)/22 * (0/z) = 3/4
PSST((0, z, z);z) = (2*2 + 1)/32 * (z/z) + 0 + 0 = 5/9
So according to the SST, poverty in y < x. This violates Weak Population Focus. ●

Proposition 2. The Sen Index (S) does not satisfy Weak Population Focus.
Proof:
We have:
PS((0, z);z) = 2/(2*2*z) * ( 1 * (z)) = 1/(2z)*z = 1/2
PS((0, z, z);z) = 2/(2*3*z) * ( 1 * z ) = 1/(3z)*z=1/3
So according to S, poverty in y < x. This violates Weak Population Focus. ●
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Alternately we can derive a contradiction this way:
Combining (5) and (7) we get:
(10) Merely adding rich people to a population cannot make a population less poor.
Combining (10) and (6) we get:
(9) Merely adding rich people to a population cannot make a population richer.
This contradicts:
(4) Merely adding rich people to a population can make a population richer.
The analysis of the problem here is that “making a population less poor” is not clearly the same as “reducing poverty”. The
ambiguity still concerns the distinction between the poverty in a population and a population’s poverty.
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For related work on inequality measurement see: (Rabinowicz, 2003; Arrhenius, 2013).
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The idea here is different from Derek Parfit’s mere addition paradox discussed below (Parfit, 1984).
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xvii
The formulation of the SST comes from (Aguirregabiria, 2006). The formulation of the S comes from (Sen, 1976).

